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Abstract 
Grandfathered emissions permits redistribute income to wealthy households by creating 
firm rents that ultimately accrue to shareholders. Consequently, they can be highly regressive, 
even if the poor do not have large budget shares for polluting goods. Using an analytical model, 
this paper estimates the burden borne by different income groups when emissions permits are 
used to control power plant emissions of carbon, SO2, and NOx. We also compare the burden 
borne by poor households under permits with that under emissions taxes, performance standards, 
technology mandates, and input taxes. And we show how the social costs of policies differ from 
efficiency costs when society has aversion to inequality. 
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 Are Emissions Permits Regressive? 
Ian W. H. Parry 
Introduction 
Economists have long advocated the use of market-based policies to achieve 
environmental objectivesnamely emissions taxes and tradable emissions permitsas, unlike 
“command and control” policies, they allow firms the flexibility to reduce pollution at lowest 
cost. Indeed the superiority of market-based approaches has been recognized in a number of 
recent policy initiatives and proposals. At the national level, tradable emissions permits have 
been implemented for power plant emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2), and at the regional level for 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) in the Los Angeles Basin and for a group of states in the Northeast. 
Proposals to implement tradable permits at the national level for mercury and NOx, and to tighten 
the program for SO2, are currently being debated. Moreover, the tradable permits approach 
pioneered by the US is now receiving a great deal of attention throughout the world as a possible 
tool in managing greenhouse gas emissions. 
To date regulators in the US have given out emissions permits for free by 
“grandfathering” them; there has been practically no use of emissions taxes or auctioned permits. 
However recent literature exploring the interactions between environmental policies and the 
broader fiscal system has shown that there is an important efficiency advantage to using 
emissions taxes/auctioned permits over grandfathered permits. By increasing firm production 
costs and product prices environmental policies reduce the real household wage and can have 
adverse effects on labor supply in the same way that a direct tax does. The reduction in labor 
supply leads to a welfare loss in the tax-distorted labor market that can be substantial in 
magnitude relative to the partial equilibrium welfare effects of environmental policies. Unlike 
under grandfathered permits, much of this additional cost can be offset, or perhaps more than 
offset, under emissions taxes/auctioned permits, if the revenues from these policies are used to 
reduce distortionary taxes.1  
                                                 
1 See for example Goulder et al. (1997), Parry et al. (1999) and Parry and Bento (2000). 
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This paper focuses on another disadvantage from using grandfathered permits instead of 
auctioned permits/emissions taxes that has to do with their potentially adverse effect on the 
distribution of household income. Grandfathered permits enact an income transfer towards 
higher-income groups at the expense of other households. This is because they create windfall 
gains for shareholders, who tend to be relatively wealthy; firms receive emissions permits for 
free and the market value of the permits is reflected in higher firm equity values. There is no 
windfall gain to wealthy households under other market-based or command and control 
approaches. Under auctioned permits, emissions taxes and input taxes, instead the government 
obtains revenues that can be recycled in broad tax reductions, or reductions that favor the poor. 
And under command and control policies, such as technology mandates, there is no binding 
quota on economy-wide emissions; hence no quota rents are created.2 
A number of papers provide a positive analysis of the distributional effects of 
environmental policies, though almost all focus on either pollution, energy, and transportation 
taxes, or the existing structure of predominantly command and control environmental 
regulations. Broadly speaking, this literature finds that these policies tend to be regressive, as 
low-income households spend a larger share of their income than higher-income groups on 
products whose prices rise as a result of the policies. However the degree of regressivity is 
significantly diminished when measures of lifetime household income, as opposed to annual 
income, are used.3 
To our knowledge there is only one prior study that has examined the household 
distribution effects of emissions permits. This is a paper by Dinan and Rogers (2002) that looks 
at the effects of a 15% reduction in US carbon emissions, under different mechanisms for 
allocating emissions permits. They estimate that households in the lowest income quintile would 
                                                 
2 The government does indirectly obtain some revenues under grandfathered permits through the taxation of permit 
rents. This effect is taken into account in our analysis. 
 
3 See for example Metcalf (1999) on carbon taxes; Poterba (1991a) and Casler and Rafiqui (1993) on fuel taxes; 
Poterba (1991b) on a broad range of energy taxes; Walls and Hansen (1999), West (2001), and Mayeres (2001) on 
transportation taxes; and Gianessi et al. (1979), Freeman (1979) and Robison (1985) on command and control 
policies.  
The distributional effects of environmental policies can also be viewed in terms of impacts on different regions of 
the country, on firms versus consumers, and on different industries. For some discussion of these issues see Pizer 
and Sanchirico (2001), Bovenberg and Goulder (2001), and Morgenstern et al. (2002) respectively. 
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be worse off on average by around $500 per year under grandfathered permits; households in the 
top income quintile would be better off by around $1,000, as the increased value of their 
stockholdings more than compensate them for the increase in energy prices (see their Table 6, 
top two rows). If instead the permits were auctioned with revenues returned in equal lump-sum 
rebates for all households, Dinan and Rogers estimate that low-income households would on net 
be better off by around $300 while high-income households would be worse off by around 
$1,700.4 
This paper furthers the analysis of the distributional effects of emissions permits in a 
number of respects. First, by considering a broader range of pollutants and parameter scenarios. 
We develop a generic analytical model subsequently calibrated to provide rough calculations of 
the distributional effects of using grandfathered permits to control power plant emissions of SO2, 
carbon and NOx. We illustrate results over a wide range of scenarios by varying the amount of 
abatement, budget shares across income groups, the portion of rents obtained by the government 
through profits taxation, etc.5  
Second, we compare the burden on low-income households under emissions permits with 
their burden under a range of other policy instruments. These include emissions taxes or fully 
auctioned emissions permits, performance standards, technology mandates, and dirty input 
taxes.6 Third, we provide some normative analysis by illustrating how the social costs of 
grandfathered permits and other emissions control policies differ from their pure efficiency costs 
when the social welfare function exhibits varying degrees of aversion to inequality.  
We summarize some of the main results as follows. We find that using grandfathered 
emissions permits to reduce carbon emissions from electricity by 10%, and NOx emissions by 
30%, can be highly regressive; the top income quintile is made better off while the bottom 
                                                 
4 On the other hand they find auctioned carbon permits to be regressive if revenues are used to cut payroll taxes, and 
highly regressive if they are used to cut corporate taxes. 
 
5 Another virtue of our approach (compared with Dinan and Rogers 2002) is that we derive explicit formulas for the 
distributional burden of environmental policies, which makes the underlying parameters very transparent. On the 
other hand, the computations in Dinan and Rogers are a lot more sophisticated than ours. 
 
6 The efficiency properties of these instruments have been compared in prior work (e.g., Spulber 1985, Goulder et 
al. 1999), but not their equity effects.  
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income quintile is much worse off. The cap on SO2 emissions mandated by the 1990 Clean Air 
Act Amendmentswhich has reduced emissions by roughly 45%is also regressive, but less 
so. This underscores an important point: the magnitude of permit rent relative to pure abatement 
costs, and hence the scope for perverse income redistribution, diminishes at more substantial 
levels of emissions control. We also find that the burden imposed on low-income households can 
be lower under other policiesparticularly emissions taxes, but also performance standards, 
technology mandates, and input taxesthan under grandfathered permits, as these other policies 
do not enact a transfer to wealthy shareholders. The overall social costs of grandfathered permits 
may also be significantly larger than other policies, when the social welfare function exhibits 
aversion to income inequality. 
These results should be viewed with caution, as there are a number of caveats to the 
analysis. One is that we focus on current policies for SO2 and NOxemissions controls proposed 
in various multi-pollutant bills before Congress are ultimately far more stringent and, as already 
emphasized, distributional effects are less pronounced at higher levels of abatement.7 Another is 
that we assume competitive production; this may ultimately be reasonable if the momentum for 
electricity restructuring is maintained, but it is unrealistic for power generation at present. In 
states that still regulate electricity prices the opportunity cost of grandfathered emissions permits 
is not passed on in higher product prices (Burtraw et al. 2001). And for many utilities marginal 
generation is from gas-fired plants rather than coal fired plants; under these conditions some of 
the abatement costs at coal-fired plants may come at the expense of infra-marginal producer rents 
rather than being fully reflected in higher product prices. It would be useful to model these 
special features of the electricity market in future work. Other caveats are that we do not 
integrate environmental benefits and that the use of social welfare weights is highly 
controversial. Nonetheless, the paper does provide a transparent, albeit preliminary, framework 
for understanding the household distribution effects of emissions permits and other emissions 
control instruments.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the analytical 
model and derives formulas for the burden borne by income groups under different emissions 
                                                 
7 See www.rff.org/multipollutant for a discussion of air pollution bills. One reason for looking at existing emissions 
controls is that our abatement cost functions are highly simplified and might be misleading for abatement levels that 
differ greatly from current levels. 
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control policies. Section 3 calibrates the model to SO2, carbon and NOx. Section 4 presents the 
main quantitative results. Section 5 discusses social costs when society has aversion to 
inequality. Section 6 offers conclusions and discusses limitations. 
 
1. The Model 
1.1. Assumptions 
1.1.1 Households.  
Consider a static economy with households divided into five groups according to income: 
group 1 is the lowest income quintile, group 2 the next lowest, etc.  Each group has N 
households, so the total number of households is 5N. All households purchase two consumption 
goods and work a fixed amount of time. The utility function of the representative household of 
group i is: 
(1) ) , ( i i i D C U  
Di is consumption of a dirty good (e.g., electricity, chemical or metal products) whose 
production causes pollution emissions and Ci is aggregate consumption of all other (clean) 









1 = Σ =  
The wage rate of representative household i, denoted wi, is exogenous.8 We do not 
explicitly model pre-existing labor taxes, though these are implicitly taken into account in our 
measure of the income distribution in Section 3. Disposable income, after pollution regulation, is 
i i i i G w I + + = π . Here πi is profit income, which is positive when pollution is controlled by 
grandfathered emissions permits, and depends on household i’s stock holdings in the dirty good 
                                                 
8 wi can be thought of as the household’s effective labor units. 
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industry. Gi is a cash transfer to household i from the recycling of any government revenues 
obtained from environmental policies. The household budget constraint is: 
(3)  i i i I pD C = +  
p is the price of the dirty good and the price of the clean good is normalized to unity.  
Households choose Ci and Di to maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3). 
Approximating by assuming demand for the dirty good is linear over the relevant range the 
individual demand functions can be expressed:9 
(4)  {}
0









= η ; i i i I s D =
0  
Superscript 0 denotes a value in the initial or pre-regulation equilibrium, si is i’s budget share for 
the dirty good and  i η is i’s price elasticity of demand for the dirty good (si and  i η are evaluated 
at pre-regulation prices).  
 
1.1.2 Firms.  
Firms are homogeneous and competitive and they use labor to produce the two 
consumption goods with linear technology.  
Aggregate emissions from production of the dirty good are: 
(5)  eD E =  
where e is emissions per unit of output. Firms can reduce e through end-of-pipe abatement 
activity (e.g., post-combustion scrubbers for SO2 and NOx emissions) or substituting cleaner 
inputs in production (e.g. substituting low-sulfur coal for high-sulfur coal to reduce SO2, 
substituting gas generation for coal generation to reduce carbon). We distinguish these two 
options later but for now we denote the minimized cost for reducing emissions per unit of D by: 
                                                 
9 This approximation is reasonable for our purposes: the proportionate change in dirty good production in response 
to environmental regulations in our quantitative analysis is small. 






a c = ) (  
where a is emissions abatement per unit.  e e a − = 0  where e0 is baseline emissions with no 
abatement. γ > 0 and θ > 1 are parameters and c(.) is a convex function.10 
 
1.2. Emissions Permits 
Suppose that the government imposes a system of (tradable) emissions permits and that 
the resulting equilibrium permit price is τ; thus, permit rents are τE. We assume that the 
government obtains fraction λ of these rents, through taxing profit income, or possibly 
auctioning a portion of the permits. λ = 0 corresponds to a fully grandfathered policy with no 
taxation of rents; λ = 1 corresponds to a fully auctioned permit program, an emissions tax, or 
100% profit taxation. Government revenue, R, is: 
(7)  E R λτ =  





















i i G G =  is a distributionally neutral case in which government revenues are returned to 
household i in proportion to the household’s income as a share of total income. 
LST
i i G G =  is a 
progressive case where revenues are divided in equal lump sum transfers across all 5N 
households.11  
                                                 
10 Implicitly, firms also produce dirty and clean intermediate goods used in the production of D. Explicitly modeling 
intermediate goods does not affect the results, so long as they are produced with constant returns. 
 
11 The use of revenues from environmental policies to reduce income taxes has been discussed extensively in the 
recent “double dividend” literature (e.g., Goulder 1995, Oates 1995). Lump-sum rebates have been proposed in the 
context of carbon permits (e.g., Kopp et al. 2000, AECS 2000); the idea here is that all individuals own the “rights” 
to the atmosphere, and each individual should receive an equal amount of the rent generated when rights are 
auctioned off. 
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1.2.1 Equilibrium.  
Under emissions permits (denoted EP) firms choose emissions reductions to minimize 
the sum of abatement costs and the opportunity cost of using permits to cover emissions (rather 
than selling them). Thus they set marginal abatement costs equal to the permit price. The private 
cost of producing a unit of D increases by the abatement costs and the opportunity costs of 
permitsthat is, triangle c(a) plus the rectangle τe in Figure 1(a)and these costs are fully 
reflected in higher prices as firms are competitive (e.g., Spulber 1985).12 Thus: 

















EP ;) ( 0
EP EP EP a c e p p + + = τ ;) (
EP EP EP p D e E =  
In this equilibrium the (net of tax) profit income for a household in group i is: 
(10)  E N ki i τ λ π ) 1 )( / ( − = ; 5 5 1 1 / / I k I k <<  
ki is the fraction of total stockholdings in the dirty good industry held by all households in 
quintile i, where  1
5
1 = Σ = i i k , and  E τ λ) 1 ( −  is aggregate permit rents accruing to firms in the dirty 
good industry, which are reflected in higher equity values. In general ki/Ii increases with income; 
that is, profit income is a higher fraction of total income for higher income households.13 Positive 
profits persist despite the competitive equilibrium: the pollution quota acts like a cartel by 
driving up product prices and limiting entry of new firms (see Spulber 1985 for a formal proof). 
 
                                                 
12 In practice a portion of abatement expenditures may represent fixed capital installation costs, rather than 
expenditures that vary directly with the level of plant generation. However, our assumption of constant marginal 
production costs at the industry level may still be reasonable if we view the unit of output as plant generation, and D 
as the total number of plants. Nonetheless, it would be useful to develop a model with fixed costs and variable 
output at the plant level to explore under what conditions fixed abatement costs are fully passed on in higher product 
prices. 
 
13 If profits were the same fraction of income for all households then the profit income generated by grandfathered 
permits would not be regressive. 
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1.2.2 Burden of emissions permits.  
We decompose the net burden under emissions permits for household i, denoted NBi, 
into: (a) the initial burden, Bi, which is gross of any income compensation and (b) the income 
compensation,  i I ∆ , from profit income or from government transfers. That is: 
(11)  i i i I B NB ∆ − = ; i i i G I π + = ∆  















D p i i η  
The initial burden is the loss of consumer surplus under household i’s demand curve for the dirty 
good between the initial and ex post price. This is shown by area abcd in Figure 1(b), equal to 
the first order reduction in surplus from the price increase, rectangle abed, plus the second order 
Harberger triangle bce from the reduction in demand. From (4) and (11), we can infer that B1/I1 
is greater (less) than B5/I5 if s1 is greater (less) than s5 (to simplify the discussion we assume that 
all households have the same demand elasticitiesthis is relaxed in the sensitivity analysis). 
That is, the initial burden is greater as a share of income for the lowest-income quintile than the 
highest-income quintile if the former have higher budget shares for the dirty good.  




1 1 / / I I I I ∆ < ∆  for 
PROP
i i G G =  and λ < 
1, because  5 5 1 1 / / I k I k < . That is, if a positive portion of the permit rents are reflected in higher 
firm profits, and the remainder obtained by government is returned in a distributionally neutral 
fashion, the income compensation effect is a smaller portion of income for low-income 
households than for high-income households. This is because profit income accrues 
disproportionately to higher income groups.  
We distinguish three notions of a regressive policy. Under a “strongly regressive” policy 
the net burden is positive for the lowest-income quintile and negative for the highest-income 
quintile. Under an “intermediate regressive” policy the net burden is positive for the highest 
income quintile but smaller in absolute terms than that for the lowest-income quintile. And under 
a “moderate regressive” policy the net burden for the highest-income quintile is larger than that 
for the lowest-income quintile in absolute terms, but less as a proportion of income. 
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1.3. Other Environmental Policies 
The distributional effect of other environmental policies is fairly straightforward. Under 
performance standards and technology mandates the price of the dirty good rises only because of 
abatement coststhere are no scarcity rents. The degree of regressivity or progressivity simply 
depends on the relative budget shares (and price elasticities) for polluting goods for different 
income groups. Under a tax on emissions or dirty inputs all the policy rents accrue to the 
government and, if they are recycled in proportion to income, again whether the policy is 
regressive or progressive depends on relative budget shares. 
In comparing emissions permits with other policies we therefore focus on a slightly 
different issue. For a given total emissions reduction we examine whether low- and high-income 
households are worse off or not under emissions permits than under other policies. Clearly, given 
our two cases for revenue recycling in (8), low-income households are worse off under 
grandfathered permits than under an emissions tax, as the permit rents accruing to firms go 
disproportionately to the better off. But whether low-income groups are worse off under permits 
than under a performance standard, technology mandate and dirty input tax, is ambiguous. These 
other policies do not transfer wealth to shareholders, but they are more costly in terms of 
economic efficiency. That is, the abatement cost portion of the price increase for the dirty good is 
larger under these polices than under permits. 
 
1.3.1  Emissions tax.  
We do not explicitly model this policy; it is simply equivalent to emissions permits with 
λ = 1. 
 
1.3.2 Performance standard.  
Under this policy (denoted PS), firms choose abatement a
PS to minimize abatement costs 
c(a) in (6), subject to the constraint 
PS PS e e a − = 0 , where emissions per unit e
PS is specified 
exogenously by the government. The price of the dirty good and emissions are: 
(9
PS) ) ( 0
PS PS a c p p + = ;) (
PS PS PS p D e E =  Resources for the Future  Parry 
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The price of the dirty good rises because of abatement costs only; there are no scarcity 
rents corresponding to rectangle τe in Figure 1(a). For a given total emissions reduction, final 
output does not fall by as much as under emissions permits (because the price increase is 
smaller); therefore the reduction in emissions per unit of output, and hence the value of c(.), must 
be greater under the performance standard for a given reduction in E (see Spulber 1985 and 
Goulder et al. 1999 for formal proofs). However, the difference in c(.) under the two policies is 
small in our simulations below (nearly all of the reduction in E comes from reducing emissions 
per unit rather than reducing final output under both policies).14 The net burden for a quintile 
under the performance standard is obtained from (9
PS), (4) and (11), with  0 = ∆ i I .  
 
1.3.3 Technology mandate.  
To analyze this policy (denoted TM), and the input tax, we distinguish two types of 
activity for reducing emissions per unit of output: end-of-pipe abatement, for which the cost 
function is  θ γ µ
θ / ) 1 ( ) ( a a a a a c + = , and input substitution, for which the cost function is 
θ γ µ µ
θ / ) 1 ( ) (
1
s s s a a c
− + = . Here µ  > 0 is a parameter reflecting the cost of end-of-pipe 
abatement relative to input substitution. The envelope of these curves (i.e. the cost function in 
(6)), and the cost-minimizing solutions for aa and as are: 
(12)  ) ( ) ( ) (
,
s s a a
a a
a c a c Min a c
s a













Consider a policy that requires firms to do a given amount of abatement activity 
TM TM e e a − = 0  through end-of-pipe treatment.15 For this case price and emissions are: 
                                                 
14 In practice firms have different abatement costs and, since a performance standard applies equally to all firms, it 
will lead to too much abatement at high-cost firms, and too little at low-cost firms (compared with tradable 
emissions permits). In this regard our homogeneous firm model understates the overall efficiency cost, and price 
increase, under the performance standard. The same point applies to the technology mandate (see Burtraw and 
Cannon 2000 for more discussion). 
 
15 We assume that the regulator picks the most efficient technology for firms, which may not be the case in practice; 
in this regard we may understate the costs of a technology mandate relative to other policies.  
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(9
TM) ) ( 0
TM
a
TM a c p p + = ;) (
TM TM TM p D e E =  
For a given total emissions reduction, the price increase is higher under this policy than under the 
performance standard because abatement costs are higher when options for input substitution are 
not exploited (i.e. the cost curve ca(.) lies above c(.)). The price increase (and reduction in 
output) could be larger or smaller than under emissions permits depending primarily on whether 
) (
TM
a a c  is larger or smaller than  ) (
EP EP a c e + τ . The net burden for a quintile is obtained from 
(9
TM), (4) and (11), with  0 = ∆ i I .  
1.3.4 Input tax. 
 Finally, we consider a tax on polluting inputs (denoted IT) used to produce the dirty 
good, where the tax is levied in proportion to the pollution content of inputs. The tax is t per unit 
of pollution content, equivalent to te per unit of output. The tax encourages a reduction in e 
through input substitution, but not through end-of-pipe treatment, hence the relevant cost curve is 
cs(.). For emissions abatement 
IT IT e e a − = 0 , the product price, emissions per unit, total 
emissions, and government revenue under this policy are: 
(9
IT) ) ( 0
IT
s

















IT ;   ) (
IT IT IT p D e E = ;   ) (
IT IT p D te R =  
For a given reduction in total emissions E, the reduction in emissions per unit of output is 
smaller under the input tax than under emissions permits, as the policy does not exploit end-of-
pipe abatement. Consequently, more of the reduction in E comes through a reduction in final 
output under the input tax, i.e. the increase in product price is greater (again these are established 
results in the literaturesee e.g., Goulder et al. 1999). The net burden for a quintile under this 
policy is obtained from (4), (8), (9
IT) and (11) with  i i G I = ∆ .  
 
 
2. Benchmark Parameters 
We use data on the Consumer Expenditure Survey to divide households into quintiles 
according to total expenditure (our measure of lifetime income), and to obtain household budget Resources for the Future  Parry 
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shares and the distribution of stock ownership. We calibrate the model, albeit very crudely, to the 
control of SO2, carbon and NOx from the electricity sector (i.e. three independent calibrations) 
using simulation results from Haiku, a detailed model of the electricity market discussed in 
Burtraw et al. (2001), Carlson et al. (2000), Banzhaf et al. (2002) and Paul and Burtraw (2002). 
The benchmark parameters are summarized in Table 1. In the sensitivity analysis we consider a 
range of alternative scenarios. 
 
2.1 Income distribution.  
Previous studies of the distributional effects of environmental policies usually use proxies 
for annualized lifetime or “permanent” income, as these are a better measure of individual well-
being than current income.16 We follow Poterba (1989, 1991a and b) by using consumption to 
proxy for annualized lifetime income.17  
We use data from Harris and Sabelhaus (1997), which is based on 2959 observations 
from the 1997 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), aggregated over four quarters. The sample 
is meant to be representative of national averages. The sample was divided into quintiles 
                                                 
16 Annual income differs from permanent income because earnings rise over the life cycle and because of transitory 
factors (e.g. temporary layoffs). Spending on polluting goods tends to be a smaller portion of the budget of young 
and older individuals when their income is measured on an annualized lifetime basis rather than current income 
(e.g., Poterba 1991a and b). 
 
17 The consumption measure reflects spending power net of the effect of the tax system. But it is far from a perfect 
measure of well-being. For example, if, due to capital market imperfections, young workers are liquidity 
constrained, their consumption will understate their annualized lifetime income (e.g., Zeldes 1989). In addition, 
high-income households end their lives with considerable wealth and, if they gain utility from bequests, 
consumption may significantly understate their well-being. 
Some other studies have used econometric methods relating income to education and other socioeconomic 
and demographic variables to construct more sophisticated measures of lifetime income (e.g., Fullerton and Rogers 
1993, Casperson and Metcalf 1994, Walls and Hanson 1999, and Slesnick 1994). Our objective is to obtain some 
quick estimates of budget shares and stock ownership across low- and high-income households that can serve as a 
benchmark, and for this purpose we stick with the simpler consumption measure. 
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according to household consumption, with equal numbers of households in each quintile.18 The 
mean household consumption within a quintile was $10,294 for the lowest income quintile, 
$18,404 for the next lowest, $25,856 for the middle income, $36,462 for the second richest and 
$62,453 for the highest income quintile. Average consumption per household across all quintiles 
is $30,694. 
We use consumption as the basis for the government recycling revenues back to 
households in proportion to their “income”. For our purposes, this is the right measure for 
distributionally neutral recycling. In practice recycling revenues on the basis of observed income 
is probably a more realistic scenario, though it would be regressive in the sense that the ratio of 
observed income to consumption (“true” income) increases with income.  
 
2.2  Budget shares for electricity.  
We aggregated spending on electricity across all members in a quintile in 1997 and 
divided by the value of total consumption of that quintile. This gave budget shares of 0.059, 
0.045, 0.034, 0.029 and 0.021 for the lowest to highest income quintiles respectively. However 
direct household consumption accounts for only 42% of total electricity sales: the remainder is 
split about equally between industrial and commercial users, and is effectively an intermediate 
good in the production of goods in general.19 We assume that the use of other electricity drives 
up the price of consumption goods in general (rather than goods disproportionately favored by 
low-income groups), and therefore the budget shares for this component of electricity sales are 
taken to be equal across households. Making this adjustment implies each household’s budget 
shares increase in absolute terms by 0.037. This gives the shares reported in Table 1. The budget 
share for the top income quintile is 60% of that for the lowest income quintile, implying that the 
initial burden of policies will be regressive.  
                                                 
18 Consumption includes food, clothing, rent and utilities, out of pocket medical, motor vehicles and parts, furniture 
and household equipment, housing interest and property taxes, housing intermediate goods, life insurance premiums, 
gifts to organizations, personal interest expenses and other goods and services.  
 
19 See see www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epav1/ta5p1.html. 
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2.3 Stock ownership.  
We calculate stock ownership by aggregating the value of stocks, bonds, retirement 
assets, etc. reported by each household in the CES, aggregated for each quintile, and expressed 
as a fraction of the total value of stockholdings. According to this calculation, the top income 
quintile owned 53% of stockholdings, while the lowest income quintile owned 3.5% (see Table 
1). Ideally, since we are calibrating emissions control policies to the electricity sector, we would 
use information on the distribution of electricity stock ownership across households rather than 
total stock ownership. However this is particularly difficult to obtain because households hold 
the bulk of these stocks indirectly through large institutional investors.20 
 
2.4 Government share of permits rents. 
 Profit income is taxed at the firm level through corporate income taxes and at the 
household level through federal and state income taxes of dividends and capital gains taxes. 
There is uncertainty about the overall effective tax rate due to the variability of personal and 
corporate rates with income and various exemptions (e.g. deferred payments for assets 
accumulating in retirement accounts). Judd (1987) uses a range of 0.3 to 0.5 for the effective tax 
on profits, while Lucas (1990) uses 0.35. For the case of grandfathered permits we assume λ = 
0.35. 
 
2.5  Electricity data.  
Multiplying the budget shares in Table 1 by income and aggregating over households 
(there are 21,176,904 households per quintile nationwide) gives total electricity expenditure, D0, 
                                                 
20 Dinan and Rodgers (2002) also used data on aggregate stockholdings, however they looked at current capital 
income only. Thus, their definition of capital excludes assets held in retirement accounts, which are more evenly 
dispersed among income groups than non-retirement financial capital. In their analysis the top income quintile owns 
86% of stocks; consequently grandfathered permits are more regressive. 
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of $218 billion. In 1997 the retail price for electricity, p0, was $68.5/MWh.21 Thus, D0 = 3,178 
million MWh.  
In the Haiku model the price elasticity for electricity η is –0.25, and we use this for our 
starting value. This is a combined estimate averaged across regions, time blocs, and residential, 
commercial, and industrial users, though it might be conservative as it represents a short to 
medium run rather than long run estimate. But our results are not sensitive to higher values (see 
below).  
 
2.6 Emissions and Abatement costs.  
The Haiku model is benchmarked for 2010, although cost estimates are expressed in 
current dollars. We assume that the (marginal) costs of a given proportionate reduction in 
emissions are the same today as in 2010. We also assume the marginal abatement cost functions 
are linear, i.e. θ = 2. This actually seems a reasonable approximation for carbon emission 
reductions up to about 30%, SO2 reductions up to about 85% and NOx reductions up to about 
60% (see Burtraw et al. 2001, Figure 2, and Banzhaf et al. 2002, Figures 2a and 2b).22 
When fully phased in, Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments places a cap of 
about 9 million tons on power plant emissions of SO2. This represents a reduction of around 44% 
below baseline levels (E0 = 16 million tons), and in current dollars the equilibrium permit price τ 
is estimated at $290 (Carlson et al. 2000). Dividing emissions by output and plugging these 
numbers into  τ γ = − ) ( 0
EP e e  gives γ.23 Roughly speaking, about half of the emissions reduction 
                                                 
21 From www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epav1/ta6p1.html. 
 
22 If the marginal abatement cost curve were convex rather than linear, this would increase the size of permit rents 
relative to the pure abatement costs and strengthen our results, for a given point estimate of the marginal cost of 
abatement. This can be seen from Figure 1(a) by drawing the marginal abatement cost curve as convex, while still 
passing through the origin and (a, τ). 
 
23 In obtaining values for γ for all three pollutants we assume that output is the same with and without the emissions 
cap. This is reasonable based on Haiku because output changes by around 1% or less for the policy simulations that 
we use for calibration. However in our actual simulations output does vary—though only modestly—as we change 
the amount of emissions reduction. 
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to date has been from substituting low-sulfur coal for high-sulfur coal and about half from post-
combustion scrubbing; therefore we choose µ = 1 (e.g., Carlson et al. 2000). For this case we 
assume the technology mandate is a scrubber, and the input tax is a tax in proportion to the (ex 
ante) sulfur content of coalthe input tax encourages the optimal use of low-sulfur coal, but not 
any scrubbing. 
In the Haiku model baseline carbon emissions are 520 million tons, with 86% of those 
emissions from coal and oil generating plants, 14% from gas, and none from other fuels. A 
system of (auctioned) carbon permits that yields a permit price of $50/ton reduces emissions 
about 10% below baseline levels.24 These numbers imply γ = 3056. Nearly all of the reduction in 
carbon emissions per unit of electricity comes from substituting gas-fired generation for coal-
fired. Currently there are no economically viable scrubbing technologies; hence we do not 
consider a technology mandate for this case (µ = ∞). We also do not explicitly consider a tax on 
the carbon content per unit of inputs, as this would be equivalent to auctioned emissions permits 
in our model. 
In 1998 a cap-and-trade program was introduced to reduce summertime power plant 
emissions of NOx from 19 eastern states. The program is estimated to reduce nationwide annual 
emissions by 22% below baseline levels of around 5.4 million tons; if the program were 
extended to cover emissions year round (which would make sense from a benefit/cost 
perspective) national emissions would fall by around 43% (Burtraw et al. 2000). As a 
compromise, and to differentiate the benchmark abatement scenario from SO2, we consider an 
emissions reduction of 30%. We assume the permit price at this emissions reduction is 
$700/ton.25 Around 70% of these reductions come from technology adoption (low NOx burners 
and post-combustion scrubbers installed at coal and gas plants) and most of the remainder from 
fuel substitution. From (12) this implies µ = 0.429. For this case we assume the technology 
mandate leads to the efficient adoption of NOx reducing technologies, while the input tax is on 
the (ex ante) NOx content of fuels. 
                                                 
24 Based on (unpublished) simulations that update results in Burtraw et al. (2001), Figure 2. The original US pledge 
to reduce national carbon emissions to 7% below 1990 levels by 2010 would imply emissions reductions below 
baseline levels of around 30% (EIA 1999). This target has proved to be politically unacceptable with the US 
withdrawal from Kyoto in 2002; hence we consider a more modest target to begin with. 
 
25 Based on Banzhaf (2002), Figure 2b. 
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The model is easily solved by starting with a given permit price, then calculating 
emissions per unit, followed by abatement costs, price, demand, total emissions, government 
transfers, and finally the net burdens, using  (2), (4), (5), and (7)-(11). 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Emissions Permits 
3.1.1 Benchmark results. 
 Table 2 shows the distributional burden under our benchmark parameter assumptions for 
SO2, carbon and NOx. The percentage reductions in total emissions are 10% for carbon, 30% for 
NOx and 44% for SO2.26  
The carbon policy is strongly regressive, regardless of how the portion of permit rents 
obtained by the government is recycled. And at least for distributionally neutral recycling, the 
NOx policy is strongly regressive while the SO2 policy is intermediate regressive. Under the 
carbon policy the initial burden for the top income quintile is $406, nearly four times that for the 
lowest income quintile, but nearly all of this is offset by profit income of $370, and taking 
account of government recycling there is a net gain for the richest households of $39 to $117. 
For the lowest income quintile the profit income is only $24, and overall they are worse off by 
between $6 and $56. Similar qualitative results apply to NOx, although the dollar figures 
involved are much smaller. Under SO2 there is a positive net burden for the top income 
households, but as a portion of income, it is only between 1% and 32% of the burden for the 
lowest income quintile. 
 
                                                 
26 The reductions in emissions per unit of output are slightly lower than these figures because output changes, 
though only by a small amount. Electricity output is 3093, 3166 and 3167 MWH respectively under the carbon, SO2 
and NOx policies, compared with the pre-regulation level of 3178 MWh. 
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3.1.2 Alternative abatement levels.  
Figure 2 illustrates how the (absolute) net burden for the top income quintile, expressed 
relative to that for the bottom income quintile, changes as we vary the emissions reduction for 
each pollutant between 0 and 70% (for proportional revenue recycling).  
Grandfathered emissions permits are strongly regressive for all pollutants for emissions 
reductions below about 40-50% (i.e. the curves lie below the horizontal axis because NB for the 
top income group is negative). Below emissions reductions of below about 60-65% emissions 
permits are at least intermediate regressive for all three pollutants (i.e. the curves are less than 
unity because NB for the top income group is less than that for the bottom income group). And 
even at a 70% emissions reduction the net burden for the top income group is less than double 
that for the lowest income group, even though their income is six times as large. The degree of 
regressivity is especially large at low amounts of abatement as permit rents, and hence the 
windfall gains to the top income group, are a relatively large portion of the initial burden. That is, 
τe is large relative to c(a) in Figure 1(a), or abfg in Figure 1(b) is a large portion of trapezoid 
abcd. As abatement increases the relative magnitude of the permit rents declines; pure abatement 
costs are responsible for a greater portion of the product price increase and the initial burden. At 
the limit of 100% abatement there would be no rents generated and no windfall gains to the top 
income quintile. 
The other main point from Figure 2 is that the curves are very close together; in fact those 
for SO2 and NOx are virtually indistinguishable. That is, for a given level of abatement the 
degree of regressivity is more or less the same for all three pollutants. This is because the portion 
of the product price increase due to permit rents is about the same for all three pollutants at a 
given emissions reduction. 
 
3.1.3 Budget shares.  
Not all of the regressivity of grandfathered permits is due to the wealth transfer to high-
income groups; part of it is because low-income groups have relatively high budget shares for 
polluting goods. In Table 3 we illustrate how the benchmark results in Table 2 would change if 
instead all income groups have the same initial budget shares (for the case of proportional Resources for the Future  Parry 
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recycling).27 The carbon policy is still strongly regressive. However, the net burden for the 
lowest income quintile is reduced by more than 50%, while the net gain for the top income 
quintile is reduced by 50% or more. The SO2 policy changes from intermediate regressive to 
moderate regressive, and the NOx policy from strongly regressive to intermediate regressive.  
 
3.1.4 Government share of rents.  
In Figure 3 we show the net burden for the top income quintile relative to that for the 
bottom income quintile as we vary the share of permit rents accruing to the government between 
0 and 1. To isolate the effect of the wealth transfer we set all the household budget shares equal 
(to 0.067), and assume proportional revenue recycling. 
The relative net burden for the top income quintile increases as the portion of rents 
accruing to the government rises (and that accruing in profit income declines). At the extreme 
when all rents go to the government the net burden is proportional to household income for all 
policies; all three curves converge at 6.1, the ratio of income for qunitile 5 to that for quintile 1. 
But the main point from Figure 3 is that for the carbon policy the government has to obtain at 
least 80% of the permit rents to prevent the policy from being strongly regressive; for NOx it has 
to obtain 30% of the permit rents. 
 
3.1.5  Further sensitivity analysis.  
Table 4 provides some further sensitivity analysis. It shows how the net burden for the 
top and bottom income quintilesfor the case of carbon with proportional recyclingvaries 
with demand elasticities, abatement costs, and stock ownership. 
The results are not very sensitive to varying the demand elasticities, either for all 
households, or for poor households versus rich households (i.e. triangle bcd in Figure 1(b) is 
always small relative to rectangle abed). Varying the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve 
in Figure 1(a) affects the electricity price, and hence the net burden for all income groups, by the 
                                                 
27 To keep initial aggregate electricity demand the same this budget share must be 0.067. 
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same proportion; it does not affect the net burden for one group relative to that for another. The 
results are, not surprisingly, sensitive to the distribution of stock ownership. For example, if the 
top income quintile owned 80% of stocks rather than 53%, their net gain would be $311 rather 
than $117. 
 
3.2 Comparison with Other Instruments 
Table 5 shows the net burden for quintiles 1 and 5 under all five emissions control 
instruments, given our benchmark scenarios for parameters and abatement levels. The table 
shows that the top income quintile is always better off (or not as worse off) under grandfathered 
permits than other policies, and by a large amount. For example, under SO2 control the net 
burden on quintile 5 is anywhere between 1.9 and 34 times as large under other policies than 
under grandfathered permits. Conversely, at least for the case of proportional revenue recycling, 
the bottom income quintile is worse off under grandfathered permits than under other 
instruments, with the exception of the input tax. 
The reasons for these results are straightforward. Unlike grandfathered permits, the other 
policies do not transfer wealth in favor of quintile 5 through higher profit income. The bottom 
income quintile receives more income compensation from the government under the emissions 
tax than under grandfathered permits. And under the performance standard and technology 
mandate quintile 1 bears a smaller initial burden as there are no permit rents reflected in higher 
product prices. The initial burden on quintile 1 under the input tax is larger than under 
grandfathered permits;28 but these households receive a larger transfer from the government. 
Quintile 1 is worse off with the input tax than with grandfathered permits under proportional 
recycling but better off with the input tax under lump sum recycling. 
The net burdens under the input tax and technology mandate vary with different values 
for µ, while the net burden under other policies do not. For example, a higher value for µ raises 
the relative cost of end-of-pipe abatement and lowers the relative cost of input substitution: that 
                                                 
28 For a given emissions reduction abatement costs, and hence product prices, are higher as the input tax fails to 
exploit end-of-pipe abatement options. 
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is, it raises the net burden (for all quintiles) under the technology mandate and lowers if for the 
input tax. 
 
4. Distributional Effects and the Social Costs of Environmental Policies 
We now compare the social costs of emissions permits with the pure efficiency costs, and 
with the social cost of other environmental policies, under different assumptions about society’s 
aversion to inequality. To do this we derive distributional weights for income groups from a 
social welfare function. The use of distributional weights in policy evaluation is highly 
controversial and problematic, and we make no judgment about what set of weights, if any, 
might be appropriate. Our purpose is simply to illustrate what different societal preferences 
would imply for social costs. 29 
 
4.1 Social Welfare Function.  
We simplify by assuming that households have CES utility functionstherefore utility is 
proportional to incomeand that households have identical preferences. Under these restrictions 
social welfare can be expressed in terms of household income, and social preference parameters, 
but independently of individual preference parameters. We adopt the following social welfare 
function: 30 
                                                 
29 One problem is that it is difficult to assess to what extent income inequality is due to luck (natural ability, family 
circumstance, etc.) as opposed to effort by individuals (willingness to work hard, accumulate human capital etc.). 
See Fong (2001) and Picketty (1995) for some recent discussion on this. 
In fact it is very difficult to assess society’s preference for redistribution. It is possible to infer a set of 
distributional weights by exploring how much economic efficiency the government is willing to sacrifice to have a 
progressive, distortionary income tax system (see Gruber and Saez 2002 for a recent illustration). However the tax 
system is at least partly determined by the interplay of interest groups, rather than purely benevolent government 
behavior, implying that these type of estimates may be an unreliable indicator of society’s true preferences.  
 
30 For similar formulations see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), pp. 340, Heady (1993), pp. 20, and Mayeres 
(2001).  
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where W is social welfare (in dollars), and I  is mean household income. β is a “preference for 
equality” parameter. When β = 0 social welfare equals the sum of individual income, thus 
changes in the distribution of welfare have no effect on W (a standard assumption implicit in 
regulatory cost assessment). When β > 0 social welfare is increased (reduced) when income is 
redistributed towards (away from) low-income households. 















This is the social welfare weight attached to changes in household i’s income, or net burden from 
emissions control policies (the weight would always be unity for a household with mean 
income). We consider cases where β = 0, 0.5 and 1. Given the income distribution in Table 1, 
when β = 0.5 the weights for the lowest and highest income quintiles are 1.73 and 0.70 
respectively and when β = 1 they are 2.98 and 0.49. The social cost of emissions control policies 













that is, the sum of net burdens, where net burdens are multiplied by the distributional weights.  
 
4.2 Results.  
Table 6 computes the formula in (15) for our benchmark parameter values, abatement 
levels, and the different emissions control policies. The first column, when β = 0, shows the pure 
efficiency costs of the policies (ignoring distributional effects). Here the emissions tax and 
emissions permit policies are equivalent; for SO2 and NOx the performance standard is slightly 
more costly than emissions permits and the technology mandate and input tax are substantially 
more costly. Resources for the Future  Parry 
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The social costs of grandfathered permits can be substantially increased if society has 
aversion to inequality. For example, the social costs of carbon policies increase from $1,310 
million to $3,262 million when β = 0.5, and to $5,702 million when β = 1, for proportional 
recycling. The social costs of emissions taxes with proportional recycling can also increase 
substantiallythough by less than under grandfathered permitsas this policy is still regressive, 
because of the relatively high budget shares for low-income households. But if revenues are 
returned in a progressive fashionin equal lump-sum transfersthe social costs of the 
emissions tax are much lower, and negative in the case of carbon and NOx.  
Finally, when society has aversion to income inequality the cost-effectiveness ranking of 
grandfathered permits relative to policies that are inefficient from a pure efficiency perspective 
may change. For example the performance standards for SO2, carbon, and NOx are more costly 
than grandfathered permits on pure efficiency grounds, but less costly in most scenarios when β 
= 0.5 and 1.31 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper, building on earlier work by Dinan and Rogers (2002), demonstrates the 
potential importance of equity considerations for the choice of grandfathered emissions permits 
versus other policy instruments for environmental protection. If society cares about adverse 
changes in the distribution of income, there is a potentially strong case for using emissions taxes, 
or auctioned emissions permits, in preference to grandfathered permits (assuming revenues are 
not used for pork-barrel spending projects). Indeed if revenue recycling occurred through broad 
income tax reductions, potentially there is both a strong equity and efficiency argument for using 
emissions taxes or auctioned permits. 
We finish off by mentioning some caveats, in addition to those already emphasized.  
The analysis simplifies by ignoring additional excess burdens of environmental policies 
from fiscal interactions. These arise from the impact of pollution control policies on increasing 
                                                 
31 Of course an inefficient means of regulation can never be optimal from a welfare point of view; it can always 
dominated by an efficient instrument that avoids perverse redistribution schemes. 
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product prices, reducing real household wages and labor supply, hence exacerbating pre-existing 
tax distortions in the labor market. On the other hand efficiency gains would arise to the extent 
that revenues from environmental policies were used to reduce income taxes, hence increasing 
labor supply, and other distortions of the tax system such as the bias for tax-favored spending 
(e.g., employer provided medical insurance, owner occupied housing). A fruitful area for future 
research would be to explore how these additional efficiency losses and gains might be 
distributed across households. 
Our focus is purely on the cost side of environmental policies; assessing who benefits the 
most from a cleaner environment is a difficult task.32 And our use of social welfare weights to 
value distributional effects is highly controversial, though our purpose is simply to illustrate the 
implications of different assumptions. Finally, we focus on the use of household income, that is, 
the costs of goods purchased by different households. A more general model might explore how 
environmental policies affect the return to labor for different household groups; for example, if 
polluting industries disproportionately employ low-skill workers, they may impose an additional 







                                                 
32 For example, the poor often live in the most polluted parts of cities and may benefit more from improved urban 
air quality. However, cleaner air may drive up rents, thereby displacing low-income renters. See Gianessi et al. 
(1979) for more discussion. 
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income Electricity fraction of
$ budget share stocks
I i s i k i
Income quintile 1 10,294 0.096 0.035
2 18,404 0.081 0.111
3 25,856 0.070 0.091
4 36,462 0.065 0.234
5 62,453 0.058 0.529
mean 30,694
1.0
Government share of permit rents λ  0.350
Baseline electricity price p 0, $/MWh 68.5
Baseline electricity output X0, mn MWh 3178
Electricity price elasticity -0.25
Abatement cost parameter, θ  2
SO2 parameters
Baseline emissions, mn tons 16
Emissions cap, mn tons 9
Permit price at cap, $/ton 290
abatement cost parameters γ 131678
µ 1
Carbon parameters
Baseline emissions, million tons 520
Emissions cap, million tons 468
Permit price at cap, $/ton 50
abatement cost parameters γ 3056
µ ∞
NOX parameters
Baseline emissions, million tons 5.4
Emissions cap, million tons 3.78
Permit price at cap, $/ton 700
abatement cost parameters γ 1373402
µ 0.429









Initial burden, $ 16 25 30 39 60
Profit income, $ 3 9 7 19 42
Net burden, $ proportional recycling 11 11 16 11 1
% of income 0.104 0.058 0.060 0.029 0.001
Lump-sum recycling 5 7 14 12 9
% of income 0.048 0.039 0.055 0.033 0.015
Carbon (10% reduction)
Initial burden, $ 106 160 200 266 406
Profit income, $ 24 78 64 164 370
Net burden, $ proportional recycling 56 37 73 13 -117
% of income 0.546 0.202 0.282 0.035 -0.187
Lump-sum recycling 6 7 61 27 -39
% of income 0.061 0.038 0.236 0.073 -0.063
NOX (30% reduction)
Initial burden, $ 14 22 26 35 53
Profit income, $ 3 9 7 19 43
Net burden, $ proportional recycling 9 8 12 6 -7
% of income 0.084 0.041 0.046 0.015 -0.011
Lump-sum recycling 3 4 10 7 2
% of income 0.028 0.022 0.040 0.020 0.003
Income quintile
Table 2. Distributional Burden per Household from Emissions Controls
12345
Budget shares 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067
Net burden
SO2 $6 6 1 4 1 2 1 0
% of income 0.056 0.035 0.055 0.032 0.016
Carbon $ 2 71 46 41 7- 6 0
% of income 0.258 0.074 0.249 0.047 -0.096
NOX $4 4 1 1 7 1
% of income 0.042 0.021 0.042 0.019 0.002
Table 3. Sensitivity with respect to Budget Shares
Income quintile
(net burden with proportional recycling)Resources for the Future  Parry 
34 
  
proportional lump-sum proportional lump-sum
SO2 recycling recycling recycling recycling
grandfathered permits 11 5 1 9
emissions tax 8 -8 10 36
performance standard 5 5 17 17
technology mandate 9 9 34 34
input tax 16 -17 21 71
Carbon
grandfathered permits 56 6 -117 -39
emissions tax 34 -109 -32 191
performance standard 9 9 32 32
technology mandate na na na na
input tax 34 -109 -32 191
NOX
grandfathered permits 9 3 -7 2
emissions tax 6 -10 3 29
performance standard 3 3 9 9
technology mandate 4 4 14 14
input tax 19 -35 9 92
Table 5. Net Burden per Household Under Alternative Policies
quintile 1 quintile 5
($)
NB for quintile 1 , $ NB for quintile 5, $




η 1= -0.125, η 5 = -0.5 62 -127
η 1= -0.5, η 5 = -0.125 56 -117
3. Abatement costs
γ halved 30 -62
γ doubled  116 -237
4. Stock ownership
k 1 = .01, k 5 = .80 77 -311
k 1 = .07, k 5 = .40 35 -32
Table 4. Further Sensitivity Analysis









β  = 0
proportional lump-sum proportional lump-sum
recycling recycling recycling recycling
SO2
grandfathered permits 1018 1255 1084 1636 1241
emissions tax 1018 1138 650 1390 262
performance standard 1026 1030 1030 1133 1133
technology mandate 2041 2048 2048 2253 2253
input tax 2013 2248 1277 2741 496
Carbon
grandfathered permits 1310 3262 1766 5702 2244
emissions tax 1310 2240 -2035 3549 -6333
performance standard 1943 1949 1949 2144 2144
technology mandate na na na na na
input tax 1310 2240 -2035 3549 -6333
NOX
grandfathered permits 562 801 626 1140 736
emissions tax 562 682 183 889 -264
performance standard 564 565 565 622 622
technology mandate 805 807 807 888 888
input tax 1777 2142 437 2777 -1163
($ million)
Table 6. Total Social Costs of Pollution Control Policies
β  = 0.5 β  = 1